Archive for the ‘News’ Category

7
Jul

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a condolence call Monday to the father of a Palestinian teenager who was kidnapped and murdered Wednesday in an apparent revenge attack for the killing of three Israeli teenagers last month.

In his phone call to Hussein Abu Khieder, the prime minister expressed his outrage over the “reprehensible” murder of 16-year-old Mohammad Abu Khieder, who had been sitting alone outside his family’s home in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Shuafat when he was abducted. Six Israeli Jews were arrested Sunday, suspected of his murder for what security officials called “nationalistic” motives.

“We denounce all brutal behavior; the murder of your son is abhorrent and cannot be countenanced by any human being,” Netanyahu said. “We will bring them to trial,” he said of the suspects, “and they will be dealt with to the fullest extent of the law.”

Netanyahu’s call to the Abu Khieder family came as tensions escalated in southern Israel, along the border with the Gaza Strip. In the early hours of Monday, Israel pounded targets in central Gaza in response to more than 25 rockets fired into its territory on Sunday.

Seven Hamas members and two other people were reported killed in the airstrikes. An additional 10 militants were injured. A spokesman of the militant Islamist group Hamas, Sami Abu Zuhri, accused Israel of escalating tensions and said a price would be paid. Israel Radio reported that Islamic Jihad, another radical group in Gaza, also released a statement blaming Israel for the escalation.

On Sunday, Israel reckoned with rising homegrown extremism as it arrested six Jewish suspects who are believed to have burned Mohammad Abu Khieder to death in revenge for the killing of three Israeli teens.

The arrests shocked those on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian divide — Palestinians because many had assumed Israel would never act against its own, and Israelis because there had been widespread doubt that Jews could have carried out such a heinous crime.

Sunday’s action could help defuse what has been seen as a dangerous swelling of Palestinian anger, with violent protests in East Jerusalem and Arab towns in northern Israel feeding fears of a budding intifada, or uprising. Demonstrators who have called for such a revolt against the Israeli occupation have decried a lack of justice and had bitterly predicted that Abu ­Khieder’s killers would never face trial.

But by arresting the suspects, the Israeli government must confront ­extremist elements within its ­society.

Human rights advocates have long warned of an alarming rise in anti-Arab vandalism and vigilante attacks carried out by Jewish extremists. Such incidents are referred to by their perpetrators as the “price tag” for what they see as Israeli government concessions to the Palestinians.

“This a shock for most Israeli Jews, and I think it’s a kind of wake-up call,” Israeli Justice Minister Tzipi Livni said in an interview Sunday evening. “This is something that will change the way people think, and it will lead to a better understanding that we need to act when we see even the smallest signs of incitement, whether it is on Internet sites or price-tag attacks.”

Livni said the conflict is “not just between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it is within Israel between different Israeli citizens, and this is what worries me the most.”

Visiting the home of one of the Israeli teens slain last month after being abducted in the West Bank, Netanyahu said Abu Khieder’s killers would “face the full weight of the law.”

But he also called on the Palestinian Authority, which controls some areas of the West Bank, to go after the killers of the Israelis — Naftali Fraenkel and Gilad Shaar, both 16, and 19-year-old Eyal ­Yifrach. Israel blames the killings on Hamas, and it arrested hundreds of the group’s members during its 18-day search for the teens. But the assailants are thought to ­remain at large.  Read more…

BY RUTH EGLASH, SUFIAN TAHA AND GRIFF WITTE
Published in the Washington Post on 7 July, 2014 http://www.washingtonpost.com
20
Jun

PROCLAMACIÓN DE S.M. EL REY FELIPE VI

Written on June 20, 2014 by Waya Quiviger in News

YouTube Preview Image
19
Jun

ENHORABUENA A S.M. EL REY FELIPE VI

Written on June 19, 2014 by Waya Quiviger in News

YouTube Preview Image
18
Jun

The open warfare and shaken statehood that characterize Syria, Iraq and Libya are the painful commemoration of the Arabs’ own 100 Years War for stable, legitimate statehood.

What the French, British and Italians did in Syria, Iraq and Libya after World War I led to the last 100 years of erratic patterns of development that have now erupted in open warfare within and among some countries.

Syria, Libya and Iraq are only the most dramatic examples of countries suffering from serious sectarian and other forms of warfare that could easily lead to the fracturing of those states into smaller ethnic units. Similar but less intense tensions define most Arab states. With the exception of Tunisia, the citizens of every Arab country have always been denied any say in defining the structure, values or policies of their state.

It is no surprise, therefore, that Syria, Iraq and Libya should be at once so violent, fractious and brittle. The capture of cities and territory across northern Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) symbolizes a common aspect of the fragmented nature of many Arab countries: the ruling party or family that runs the government is at war with well-armed non-state actors that reflect widespread citizen discontent with the power and policies of the central state. The brittle Arab state is not simply melting away, as happened in Somalia over the last two decades; rather, the state in many cases has become just one armed protagonist in a battle against several other armed protagonists among its own citizens.

The novelty of Iraq today, as with Syria to a lesser extent, is the presence of fighters from many other countries who have joined the fray, because the borders of the country have largely been erased by their own lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. So in this sense ISIS is a greater threat in the short run than other such militant sectarian movements, because it controls territory that provides a base of operations; it enjoys fiscal resources (oil, bank robberies, commercial routes); it attracts fighters from abroad who have no relationship to the local people under their control; it operates as a hybrid between a guerrilla force and a formal army; and, it explicitly challenges the state-based system of countries that we inherited from the spoils of World War I.

The world has never seen such a phenomenon as this post-state territory of deterritorialized individual fighters whose only principles are anchored in an ancestral vision of religious dictates. Groups such as ISIS have no future in the Middle East. But they will be a major problem for some years to come, until legitimate statehood and efficacious governance take root. This has never really happened in most Arab states because of the ongoing lack of validation of all states by their own people.

The battle now taking place in Syria, Libya and Iraq is very complex and will continue because it combines elements of wars of independence, civil wars, attempts to redefine the borders and values of individual countries, and revenge movements against the mismanagement, sectarianism and harsh rule of the past half-century at least. Drone attacks and troops from the United States or Iran or any other foreign source will not have any significant impact on the multiple forces that drive the fighting and fragmentation in many Arab countries, and would probably only aggravate the violence.

Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya have all shown how hard it is to shape new governance systems in the wake of the ouster of their autocratic leaders, if there is no clear social contract that gives all citizens equal opportunities to reconfigure their state. Syria, Libya, Bahrain and Iraq have also indicated the willingness of many actors to use military force to maintain their rule or challenge the incumbent rulers.

The popular uprisings that erupted three-and-a-half years ago have exposed the lack of foundations for coherent statehood in several Arab countries, and in some cases led to a vacuum that has been filled by various fighting forces in Syria, Iraq and Libya. The groups that will tap the desires of indigenous communities to live in peace with one another will be the ones to emerge victorious. Until then, the region will have to endure many years of violence that will only end when ordinary people feel they have had the opportunity to engage in the two seminal state-building processes that they have always been denied – self-determination and genuine sovereignty.

ISIS and others like it reflect none of these sentiments, which is why they will not be part of the long-term scene in the region, despite their short-term prominence. Any response to ISIS should not focus on only restraining their advances, but rather on responding to the local citizens’ 100 years of unfulfilled desires for conditions that would promote their self-determination and sovereignty.

June 18; Rami G. Khouri is published twice-weekly by THE DAILY STAR. He can be followed on Twitter @RamiKhouri.

16
Jun

Who lost Iraq?

Written on June 16, 2014 by Waya Quiviger in International Conflict, Terrorism & Security, Middle East, News, Op Ed

It is becoming increasingly likely that Iraq has reached a turning point. The forces hostile to the government have grown stronger, better equipped and more organized. And having now secured arms, ammunition and hundreds of millions of dollars in cash from their takeover of Mosul — Iraq’s second-largest city — they will build on these strengths. Inevitably, in Washington, the question has surfaced: Who lost Iraq?

Whenever the United States has asked this question — as it did with China in the 1950s or Vietnam in the 1970s — the most important point to remember is: The local rulers did. The Chinese nationalists and the South Vietnamese government were corrupt, inefficient and weak, unable to be inclusive and unwilling to fight with the dedication of their opponents. The same story is true of Iraq, only much more so. The first answer to the question is: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki lost Iraq.

The prime minister and his ruling party have behaved like thugs, excluding the Sunnis from power, using the army, police forces and militias to terrorize their opponents. The insurgency the Maliki government faces today was utterly predictable because, in fact, it happened before. From 2003 onward, Iraq faced a Sunni insurgency that was finally tamped down by Gen. David Petraeus, who said explicitly at the time that the core element of his strategy was political, bringing Sunni tribes and militias into the fold. The surge’s success, he often noted, bought time for a real power-sharing deal in Iraq that would bring the Sunnis into the structure of the government.

A senior official closely involved with Iraq in the Bush administration told me, “Not only did Maliki not try to do broad power-sharing, he reneged on all the deals that had been made, stopped paying the Sunni tribes and militias, and started persecuting key Sunni officials.” Among those targeted were the vice president of Iraq and its finance minister.

The turmoil in the Middle East is often called a sectarian war. But really it is better described as “the Sunni revolt.” Across the region, from Iraq to Syria, one sees armed Sunni gangs that have decided to take on the non-Sunni forces that, in their view, oppress them. The Bush administration often justified its actions by pointing out that the Shiites are the majority in Iraq and so they had to rule. But the truth is that the borders of these lands are porous, and while the Shiites are numerous in Iraq — Maliki’s party actually won a plurality, not a majority — they are a tiny minority in the Middle East as a whole. It is outside support — from places as varied as Saudi Arabia and Turkey — that sustains the Sunni revolt.

If the Bush administration deserves a fair share of blame for “losing Iraq,” what about the Obama administration and its decision to withdraw American forces from the country by the end of 2011? I would have preferred to see a small American force in Iraq to try to prevent the country’s collapse. But let’s remember why this force is not there. Maliki refused to provide the guarantees that every other country in the world that hosts U.S. forces offers. Some commentators have blamed the Obama administration for negotiating badly or halfheartedly and perhaps this is true. But here’s what a senior Iraqi politician told me in the days when the U.S. withdrawal was being discussed: “It will not happen. Maliki cannot allow American troops to stay on. Iran has made very clear to Maliki that its No. 1 demand is that there be no American troops remaining in Iraq. And Maliki owes them.” He reminded me that Maliki spent 24 years in exile, most of them in Tehran and Damascus, and his party was funded by Iran for most of its existence. And in fact, Maliki’s government has followed policies that have been pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian.

Washington is debating whether airstrikes or training forces would be more effective, but its real problem is much larger and is a decade in the making. In Iraq, it is defending the indefensible.

June 12, The Washington Post

Fareed Zakaria writes a foreign affairs column for The Post. He is also the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and editor at large of Time magazine.

We use both our own and third-party cookies to enhance our services and to offer you the content that most suits your preferences by analysing your browsing habits. Your continued use of the site means that you accept these cookies. You may change your settings and obtain more information here. Accept