Archive for the ‘Op Ed’ Category

15
Aug

In the next few months, a mixed force of Iraqi Arab and Kurdish security forces — including various Sunni and perhaps some Shiite militia elements — will enter Mosul, clear the city of Islamic State extremists and then work to bring governance, stability and reconstruction to one of Iraq’s most complex cities and its province.

There is no question that the Islamic State will be defeated in Mosul; the real question is what comes afterward. Can the post-Islamic State effort resolve the squabbling likely to arise over numerous issues and bring lasting stability to one of Iraq’s most diverse and challenging provinces? Failure to do so could lead to ISIS 3.0.

The prospect of the operation to clear Mosul brings to mind experiences from the spring of 2003, when the 101st Airborne Division, which I was privileged to command, entered a Mosul in considerable turmoil. Our first task, once a degree of order had been restored, was to determine how to establish governance. That entailed getting Iraqi partners to help run the city of nearly 2 million people and the rest of Nineveh Province — a very large area about which we knew very little.

Establishing a representative interim council to work with us in Nineveh proved to be no easy task — and its formation and subsequent developments hold insights for the coming endeavor in Mosul. Read more…

David Petraeus is a retired U.S. Army general who commanded coalition forces in Iraq from 2007 to 2008 and Afghanistan from 2010 to 2011 and served as CIA director from 2011 to 2012. He is a partner in a major global investment firm.

August 12th, thewashingtonpost.com

19
Jul

Deniz Torcu es economista y máster en Estudios de la UE y en Relaciones internacionales
19.07.2016

El intento de golpe de Estado en la noche del viernes 15 de julio ha sido una sorpresa tanto para Turquía como para la comunidad internacional. A pesar de haber sobrevivido a una historia llena con golpes de Estado en el siglo pasado, nadie preveía un nuevo –y débil– intento de tomar el poder en este siglo. Una fracción del ejército turco supuestamente vinculada a Fettulah Gülen, el clérigo islámico que reside en Pensilvania desde hace décadas en un exilio autoimpuesto, trató de tomar el control del Estado de una manera bastante torpe, apenas cerrando puentes y enviando tanques a los principales aeropuertos, mientras que el objetivo principal, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, era capaz de detener tranquilamente sus vacaciones en la costa del Sur para conectar con los medios de comunicación a través de su teléfono móvil.

Nada más aterrizar con total seguridad en el aeropuerto Ataturk de Estambul, Erdogan pidió a la gente salir a las calles. Su llamada fue seguida de inmediato por miles de seguidores y tuvo el eco de numerosas mezquitas que comenzaron a llamar a la oración, para apoyar al Gobierno y luchar contra los rebeldes del Ejército. Y con las primeras luces del sábado 16, Erdogan anunció que “el Presidente y el Gobierno democráticamente elegidos están a cargo de la situación y todo terminará bien”. Al cabo de pocas horas, grandes fracciones rebeldes del ejército comenzaron a entregarse a una policía que en todo momento se mantuvo leal a Erdogan. Read more…

16
Jun

Egypt’s Importance in a Time of Troubles

Written on June 16, 2016 by Waya Quiviger in Middle East, Op Ed

Paul Salem is the Vice President for Policy and Research at the Middle East Institute. This piece has been published in collaboration with the Institute. The views expressed are solely those of the author.

Since the ISIS downing of a Russian airliner over Sinai in October 2015, there has been a bustle of activity between Washington and Cairo. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has been to the Egyptian capital twice, in addition to visits by high-level Congressional, military, intelligence, and business delegations. Despite continued high concern about the country’s dismal human-rights situation, there is deep awareness that Egypt needs urgent aid in its fight against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, as well as serious assistance in boosting its slow economy. There is also growing awareness that while Washington has serious and legitimate differences on a number of domestic and regional issues with almost all of its Middle Eastern allies, the United States cannot face regional challenges on its own, and must negotiate partnerships and burden-sharing with the allies it has in the region.

Egypt is indeed too big to fail, and while Cairo has a long way to go on essential economic and political reforms, it is strategically important to prevent a terrorist victory or an economic collapse in the country. Egypt faces daunting challenges, and the United States has a keen interest in helping the most populous Arab nation overcome them. After three years, the war against ISIS in Sinai grinds on with no decisive resolution in sight. The Egyptian armed forces have denied the militant jihadist group their signature goal of setting up an independent polity in northern Sinai, as ISIS has done in other countries, but this has come at a very high cost to civilians. ISIS has reverted to al-Qaeda tactics of guerilla war, but is exacting a heavy price on Egyptian military and police forces. Al-Qaeda, in the meantime, in its ambition to compete with ISIS for jihadist primacy, is urging cells and sympathizers in Egypt to take more action.  Read more…

 

Published on June 16, 2016 in realclearworld.com

31
Mar

Economic sanctions have become the “silver bullet” of American foreign policy over the past decade, because they’re cheaper and more effective in compelling adversaries than traditional military power. But Treasury Secretary Jack Lew warns of a “risk of overuse” that could neuter the sanctions weapon and harm America.

Lew made his unusual case against “sanctions overreach” in an interview last week and in a speech prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His caution against overuse comes as some Republican members of Congress are fighting to maintain U.S. sanctions on the Iranian nuclear program, despite last year’s deal limiting that Iranian threat.

By highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of sanctions, Lew is raising an important question about the nature of American power in the 21st century. Sanctions have clout because U.S. financial markets are the central nervous system of the globalized economy. But if so many sanctions are applied that the U.S. system becomes too complicated and cumbersome for foreigners, they will eventually find ways to do business outside U.S. markets — weakening both our sanctions and our underlying economy. The magic bullet will become a poison pill.

Lew notes that U.S. sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program showed how effective this weapon can be when it’s carefully fashioned as part of a broad coalition. America’s program of so-called “secondary” sanctions didn’t just ban U.S. companies from doing business with Iran; they banned any company operating in Iran from using U.S. banks or other financial institutions. That made Iran a no-go zone for most Western companies. Read more…

 

Published in the nyt.com

Opinion writer March 29

 

 

Contrast the success of this coordinated effort in bringing Iran to the table with five decades of unilateral U.S. sanctions against the Castro regime in Cuba, which Lew rightly notes were “ineffective,” to put it mildly.

Lew’s larger point is that sanctions won’t work if countries don’t get the reward they were promised — in the removal of sanctions — once they accede to U.S. demands.

1
Mar

What has really changed in Iran?

Written on March 1, 2016 by Waya Quiviger in Democracy & Human Rights, Middle East, Op Ed

I REMEMBER vividly the first time I ever voted in an Iranian election. It was a balmy summer day in June 2001, in the election that won the reformist president Mohammad Khatami a second term. The blue stamp was the first on the voting page of my identification card, and I felt a sharp, exhilarating pride.

That election is much on my mind now, as I watch the results of Friday’s voting with my family, disagreeing on what it might mean for the future.

Back in 2001, Iran was heading down an irrevocable path toward internal reform, a process untainted by any Western intrusion, with citizens and progressive-minded leaders showing the way. Those leaders seemed, at the time, as exciting as Vaclav Havel and the revolutionary cleric Musa al-Sadr rolled into one. Elections felt — unlike the vote this past weekend — full of consequence, a genuine chance to recast political power rather than an exercise in slightly recalibrating it.
Tehran then was a naïve young intellectual’s paradise. There were Islamist reformers and secular reformers, women’s rights campaigners who went door to door in villages, and urban activists working to save everything from the Iranian cheetah to the rapidly evaporating Lake Urmia. You could sit at the feet of an ayatollah in the morning and hear a Koran-backed strategy for gender equality; by afternoon, you could be with the radical student opposition in a decaying house in the center of the city, still strewn with shredded documents removed from the United States embassy during the 1979 hostage-taking. There were literary readings almost every night, and subversive theater that lampooned the system, using metaphors from baseball to Moliere. Read more…

 

Published on March 1, in www.nyt.com

Azadeh Moaveni is a lecturer in journalism at Kingston University and the author, most recently, of “Honeymoon in Tehran: Two Years of Love and Danger in Iran.”

We use both our own and third-party cookies to enhance our services and to offer you the content that most suits your preferences by analysing your browsing habits. Your continued use of the site means that you accept these cookies. You may change your settings and obtain more information here. Accept